The Velocity Paradox: A Study on Algorithmic Coercion and Gig Worker Vulnerability in Quick-Commerce
Keywords:
quick-commerce, algorithmic management, occupational safety, platform labour, worker vulnerability, gig work, algorithmic coercionAbstract
Quick-commerce platforms have compressed the retail delivery cycle from days to minutes, and in doing so have made delivery speed the central organising principle of an entire category of work. This study examines what that compression does to the workers who absorb it. Drawing on labour process theory and the emerging literature on algorithmic management, the paper advances the idea of a velocity paradox: the same algorithmic architecture that platforms present as a source of flexibility and earning freedom simultaneously functions as an instrument of coercion, because the promise of autonomy is conditional on the worker consenting to speed targets that are set, monitored and enforced by software rather than negotiated with a manager. A structured questionnaire comprising five demographic items and ten five-point Likert statements was administered to 160 quick-commerce delivery partners operating in an Indian metropolitan market, selected through purposive and snowball sampling. Data were analysed in SPSS using reliability analysis, exploratory factor analysis, Pearson correlation, multiple linear regression, one-way analysis of variance and an independent samples t-test. The instrument demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (overall Cronbach’s alpha = .869) and the factor solution recovered the three intended constructs, explaining 70.29 per cent of the total variance. Perceived algorithmic coercion and safety-compromising behaviour together explained 36.2 per cent of the variance in worker vulnerability (F(2, 157) = 44.453, p < .001), with both predictors significant. Perceived coercion also varied significantly across daily hours logged (F(3, 156) = 8.430, p < .001), indicating that the workers most exposed to the platform are also the workers who experience its control most sharply. The findings suggest that worker vulnerability in quick-commerce is not an incidental by-product of a young industry but a structural outcome of how velocity is priced, measured and enforced.
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