

India's Foreign Policy and Its Role in Contemporary International Relations

¹ Dr. Vansh Gopal

¹Assistant Professor (Political Science)

Goswami Tulsidas Government P. G. College Karwi, Chitrakoot

ABSTRACT

India's foreign policy has moved from the idealism of non-alignment to a pragmatic strategy of multi-alignment that seeks influence with every major power while preserving strategic autonomy. This paper traces that evolution up to 2019, examines the principles and determinants behind it, and assesses India's relations with the United States, China, Russia, the European Union and its neighbours. It then evaluates India's role in global governance, the United Nations, multilateral groupings and peace operations, as well as its contribution to climate action and development. The study finds that India's rising economic weight, demographic scale and democratic credentials have made it a pivotal "swing state" in the emerging multipolar order, but that a persistent boundary dispute with China, an unstable neighbourhood, trade vulnerabilities and limited state capacity constrain its ambitions. The paper concludes that India's global role will depend on sustained economic growth, deeper regional integration and institutional reform of its diplomatic machinery.

Keywords: India, foreign policy, non-alignment, strategic autonomy, multi-alignment, Global South, international relations

I INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of India's Foreign Policy

India's foreign policy was born with its independence in 1947, shaped by the experience of colonial rule, the anti-imperial struggle and the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War. Jawaharlal Nehru, who served as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, gave it an enduring character: an insistence on independent judgement, a preference for peaceful settlement of disputes and solidarity with newly decolonised states (Chacko, 2012). These foundations were reinforced by India's

civilisational self-image and its tradition of statecraft stretching back to Kautilya's Arthashastra (Saran, 2017). Over seven decades, the policy has adapted to wars, economic crises and the end of the Cold War, yet its core aim — maximising India's freedom of action — has remained constant (Pant, 2016).

1.2 Meaning and Scope of International Relations

International relations (IR) is the study of interactions among states and non-state actors, including diplomacy, war, trade, international law and global institutions. Its scope has widened from a narrow focus on security to include economics, technology, climate, migration and public health. Realist, liberal and constructivist theories offer different lenses: realists emphasise power and national interest, liberals stress institutions and interdependence, and constructivists highlight identity and norms. India's foreign policy draws on all three, combining hard-nosed balancing with institution-building and a strong sense of civilisational identity (Ogden, 2014).

1.3 Evolution of India's Foreign Policy

The policy has passed through distinct phases. The Nehruvian era (1947–1964) prioritised non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity. The 1962 war with China and the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty introduced a harder, realist edge. The economic crisis of 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted liberalisation, the "Look East" policy and engagement with the United States (Ganguly, 2010). The 1998 nuclear tests and the 2008 India–US civil nuclear agreement marked India's acceptance as a responsible nuclear power. Since 2014, the policy has become more assertive and outward-looking, expressed through "Act East", "Neighbourhood First" and an active role in plurilateral groupings (Mohan, 2015).

1.4 Significance of India in Contemporary International Relations

By 2019 India was the world's second most populous country, one of its five largest economies and its fastest-growing major economy for much of the decade. It possesses nuclear weapons, the second-largest army, a growing blue-water navy and a large scientific and digital workforce; in March 2019 it demonstrated an anti-satellite capability through Mission Shakti. Its democratic system, a diaspora of about 30 million people and leadership among developing countries give it considerable soft power (Tharoor, 2012). Scholars increasingly describe India as an emerging great power whose choices will shape the balance in the Indo-Pacific (Pardesi, 2015).

1.5 Objectives of the Study

1. To trace the evolution of India's foreign policy from non-alignment to multi-alignment.
2. To analyse India's relations with major powers and neighbouring countries.
3. To assess India's role, challenges and prospects in contemporary international relations.

II THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

2.1 Conceptual Understanding of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is the set of goals, principles and instruments through which a state pursues its national interests in relation to other states and international actors. It links domestic needs — security, prosperity and identity — to the external environment, and is carried out through diplomacy, economic statecraft, military power and cultural influence. In India's case, foreign policy has been described as a search for “strategic space” in which a large but historically under-resourced state can pursue development without becoming dependent on any single power (Bajpai, Basit, & Krishnappa, 2014). Its making is concentrated in the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of External Affairs and the national security apparatus, with Parliament, states and public opinion playing a growing role (Menon, 2016).

2.2 Principles of India's Foreign Policy

The Panchsheel, or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence agreed with China in 1954 — mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence — remain a normative reference point. Alongside them stand India's commitment to the UN Charter, nuclear disarmament, opposition to racial discrimination and colonialism, and the civilisational idea of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (“the world is one family”). Saran's account shows how these values coexist with a realist understanding of power (Saran, 2017). Article 51 of the Constitution, a Directive Principle, directs the state to promote international peace and security and respect for international law.

2.3 Non-Alignment and Strategic Autonomy

Non-alignment was not neutrality but the right to judge each issue on its merits rather than through the lens of Cold War blocs. It allowed India to receive aid from both superpowers and to lead the Non-Aligned Movement founded at Belgrade in 1961 (Chacko, 2012). After the Cold War, the idea was reformulated as “strategic autonomy”: the capacity to make independent decisions on security and economics while building partnerships with all major centres of power. The influential NonAlignment 2.0 report argued that India's greatest asset is its ability to keep options open in an uncertain world (Khilnani et al., 2012).

2.4 Evolution from Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment

Since the mid-2010s, India has practised “multi-alignment”: simultaneous, issue-based partnerships with rival powers. It joined the revived Quad with the US, Japan and Australia in 2017, while also belonging to BRICS and, from the same year, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) alongside China and Russia (Hall, 2016). Basrur (2017) argues that this reflects continuity rather than rupture — a more energetic pursuit of long-standing goals. Table 1 summarises the main phases.

Table 1: Phases in the Evolution of India's Foreign Policy

Phase	Period	Dominant approach	Key developments
Nehruvian idealism	1947–1964	Non-alignment, anti-colonialism	Panchsheel (1954), NAM (1961), war with China (1962)
Realist consolidation	1964–1990	Security-focused non-alignment	Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971), Bangladesh war (1971), Pokhran-I (1974)
Post-Cold War adjustment	1991–2004	Economic diplomacy, Look East	Liberalisation (1991), Pokhran-II (1998), US rapprochement
Strategic partnerships	2004–2014	Strategic autonomy	India-US nuclear deal (2008), G20 summit role
Multi-alignment	2014–2019	Act East, Neighbourhood First, issue-based coalitions	Quad revival (2017), SCO membership (2017), Mission Shakti (2019)

Source: Compiled by the author from Ganguly (2010), Pant (2016) and Malone, Mohan, and Raghavan (2015).

2.5 Major Determinants of India's Foreign Policy
Foreign policy is shaped by a mix of enduring and changing factors (Table 2). Geography places India at the centre of the Indian Ocean and between two nuclear-armed neighbours. Economic growth has expanded both its interests and its instruments: India's GDP rose by about 70 per cent between 2010 and 2019 (Figure 1), raising its weight in


trade, investment and development finance (Malone, 2011).

Table 2: Major Determinants of India's Foreign Policy

Determinant	Nature	Influence on policy
Geography	Enduring	Continental threats (China, Pakistan) and maritime interests in the Indian Ocean
History and culture	Enduring	Anti-colonial identity, civilisational outlook, preference for autonomy
Economy	Changing	Need for energy, technology, markets and investment
Domestic politics	Changing	Coalition dynamics, public opinion, federal states' interests
Military capability	Changing	Nuclear deterrence and growing naval reach
Leadership	Changing	Personal diplomacy and priorities of the Prime Minister
International system	Changing	Shift from bipolarity to multipolarity; US-China rivalry

Source: Adapted from Ogden (2014) and Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa (2014).

Figure 1: India's GDP, 2010–2019 (current US\$ trillion)




Source: Compiled from World Bank data; approximate values.

The growth shown in Figure 1 underpins India's larger diplomatic ambitions, though per-capita income remained around US\$2,100 in 2019, which keeps development at the centre of its foreign policy.

III INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

India's bilateral relationships reflect its multi-aligned approach: deep partnerships with the West, a managed rivalry with China, continuity with Russia and an effort to anchor its neighbourhood. Economic ties are a key indicator of these relationships (Figure 2).

Figure 2: India's Largest Trading Partners, FY2018-19 (US\$ billion)



Source: Compiled from Ministry of Commerce and Industry (DGCI&S) data; approximate values.

The United States and China were almost equal as trading partners in 2018-19, but the composition of trade differs sharply: India runs a surplus with the US and a large deficit with China.

3.1 India–United States Relations


India–US relations have been transformed since 2000 from “estranged democracies” to a comprehensive global strategic partnership. The 2008 civil nuclear agreement ended India's nuclear isolation, and the US designated India a “Major Defence Partner” in 2016. Foundational defence agreements — LEMOA (2016) and COMCASA (2018) — enabled logistics sharing and secure communications, and the first 2+2 ministerial dialogue was held in 2018. In the same year India was granted Strategic Trade Authorization Tier-1 status, easing access to sensitive technologies. Pant and Joshi (2016) argue that the US “pivot” to Asia created structural incentives for convergence, since both states seek a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Differences persist over trade, tariffs, market access and immigration; in June 2019 the US withdrew India's trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences. Even so, the partnership rests on shared democratic values and a

large, influential Indian-American diaspora (Mohan, 2015).

3.2 India–China Relations

India's relationship with China combines competition, cooperation and confrontation. The two states fought a war in 1962, and their 3,488-km boundary remains undemarcated. Tensions peaked in the 73-day Doklam standoff of 2017, after which the two leaders sought to stabilise ties through informal summits at Wuhan (2018) and Mamallapuram (2019) (Smith, 2014). China's close partnership with Pakistan, including the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor through disputed territory, its presence in South Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative, and its naval expansion in the Indian Ocean add to Indian concerns (Mohan, 2012). Economic dependence is a further vulnerability: India relies on Chinese electronics, machinery, chemicals and pharmaceutical ingredients, producing a large deficit (Figure 3).

Figure 3: India–China Trade and Trade Deficit, FY2014-15 to FY2018-19 (US\$ billion)



Source: Compiled from Ministry of Commerce and Industry (DGCI&S) data; approximate values.

The deficit stayed above US\$50 billion every year and peaked at about US\$63 billion in 2017-18, making it a strategic as well as an economic concern.

3.3 India–Russia Relations

Russia has been a “special and privileged strategic partner” since the Soviet era. It has supplied a large share of India's military equipment, cooperated on nuclear energy at Kudankulam and on space, and consistently supported India in the UN Security Council (Malone, 2011). The 2018 agreement to

purchase the S-400 air-defence system, despite the threat of US sanctions, demonstrated India's willingness to resist external pressure. At the 2019 Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, India announced a US\$1 billion line of credit for Russia's Far East. Bilateral trade remained modest, at about US\$8 billion in 2018-19, far below the political closeness of the relationship. India is also wary of Russia's growing ties with China and its outreach to Pakistan.

3.4 India and the European Union

India and the European Union have been strategic partners since 2004. The EU is one of India's largest trading partners and a major source of investment and technology. Negotiations on a Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement, launched in 2007, stalled after 2013, but relations regained momentum with the 2017 India-EU summit and the EU's 2018 strategy on India, which called for deeper cooperation on security, trade and connectivity. Both sides share interests in a rules-based order, climate action, digital governance and resilient supply chains (Malone, Mohan, & Raghavan, 2015). Bilateral partnerships with France, including the 2016 Rafale deal and joint leadership of the International Solar Alliance, and with Germany and the Nordic states (the first India-Nordic summit was held in 2018), add depth.

3.5 India's Relations with Neighbouring Countries
Under the "Neighbourhood First" policy, India has prioritised connectivity, energy links, development assistance and crisis support in South Asia. It settled its land boundary with Bangladesh in 2015 and has built power, rail and road links with Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Yet the neighbourhood remains volatile. Relations with Pakistan are defined by cross-border terrorism: after the Uri attack (2016) and the Pulwama attack (February 2019), India carried out cross-border strikes, including the Balakot airstrike. China's growing footprint, seen in the 2017 lease of Sri Lanka's Hambantota port, and political swings in the Maldives and Nepal show how domestic politics in small neighbours shape India's options

(Mukherjee & Malone, 2011). Table 3 summarises key relationships.

Table 3: India's Relations with Selected Neighbouring Countries (up to 2019)

Country	Main areas of cooperation	Key concerns
Pakistan	Limited; Kartarpur corridor (2019)	Cross-border terrorism, Kashmir, water sharing
Bangladesh	Trade, energy, Land Boundary Agreement (2015)	Migration, Teesta river waters
Sri Lanka	Development aid, energy, housing projects	Chinese presence (Hambantota), fishermen's disputes
Nepal	Hydropower, open border, connectivity	2015 border blockade legacy, Kalapani dispute, Chinese influence
Bhutan	Hydropower, security cooperation	Doklam standoff (2017), Bhutan-China boundary talks
Maldives	Security, infrastructure, emergency aid	Political swings, Chinese debt (improved after 2018)
Afghanistan	Development projects (Salma Dam, Parliament building)	Taliban insurgency, terrorism, US-Taliban talks

Source: Compiled by the author from Pant (2016) and Ministry of External Affairs annual reports.

IV INDIA'S ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

4.1 India and Global Governance

India seeks a more representative global order in which developing countries have a greater voice. Narlikar (2017) notes that India has moved from being a "naysayer" in global negotiations to a more constructive agenda-setter, especially on trade, climate and development finance. Within the G20, India has pressed for action against fugitive economic offenders, black money and tax evasion,

and for reform of the IMF and World Bank quotas. It defends the interests of developing countries at the WTO, particularly on food security and public stockholding. India also promotes its digital public infrastructure — Aadhaar, Jan Dhan accounts and the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) launched in 2016 — as a model for inclusive development.

4.2 India's Role in the United Nations

India was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 and served seven terms as a non-permanent member of the Security Council up to 2019, most recently in 2011–12; in June 2019. It has long campaigned for permanent membership, working with Brazil, Germany and Japan in the G4 to press for Security Council reform (Tharoor, 2012). India argues that a Council reflecting the power distribution of 1945 lacks legitimacy when Africa, Latin America and one of the world's largest democracies have no permanent seat. It has also played active roles in UN bodies on human rights, counter-terrorism (including its proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism), sustainable development and the law of the sea; the UN's designation of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist in May 2019 was a diplomatic success for India.

4.3 India and Multilateral Organisations

India participates in an unusually wide range of multilateral and minilateral groupings that span the West, the non-Western world and its own region (Table 4). This reflects its strategy of hedging and coalition-building rather than alliance membership (Hall, 2016).

Table 4: India's Participation in Major Multilateral and Minilateral Groupings (up to 2019)

Grouping	India's status	Main focus	India's role
United Nations	Founding member (1945)	Peace, security, development	Seven UNSC terms; G4 reform campaign
G20	Member (1999)	Global economic governance	Agenda on black money,

Grouping	India's status	Main focus	India's role
			quota reform
BRICS	Founding member (2009)	South–South cooperation, finance	New Development Bank co-founder; hosted 2016 summit
SCO	Full member (2017)	Regional security, counter-terrorism	Joined with Pakistan in 2017
Quad	Member (revived 2017)	Indo-Pacific security and connectivity	Raised to ministerial level (2019)
SAARC / BIMSTEC	Founding member	Regional cooperation	Shift of emphasis to BIMSTEC (2016 onwards)
International Solar Alliance	Co-founder (2015)	Solar energy deployment	Headquarters in Gurugram
Non-Aligned Movement	Founding member (1961)	Developing-country solidarity	Historical leadership

Source: Compiled by the author from Malone, Mohan, and Raghavan (2015) and Ministry of External Affairs.

4.4 India's Contribution to Global Peace and Security


India is one of the largest cumulative contributors to UN peacekeeping, having sent more than 200,000 personnel to around 50 missions since the 1950s, and it deployed the first all-female Formed Police Unit to Liberia in 2007. Indian forces have also undertaken humanitarian assistance and disaster relief across the Indian Ocean, from the 2004 tsunami to the 2015 Nepal earthquake (Operation Maitri), and evacuation operations such as Operation Raahat in Yemen (2015), which

rescued thousands of Indian and foreign nationals. As the “first responder” in its region and a proponent of the SAGAR vision (Security and Growth for All in the Region) announced in 2015, India positions itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean (Mohan, 2012). Its nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and no first use reinforces its image as a responsible nuclear power (Pant, 2016).

4.5 India's Role in Addressing Global Challenges

On climate change, India committed under the 2015 Paris Agreement to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33–35 per cent from 2005 levels by 2030 and set a target of 175 GW of renewable capacity, while insisting on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. It co-founded the International Solar Alliance with France in 2015 and launched the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure at the UN Climate Action Summit in 2019. Its own clean-energy build-out has been rapid (Figure 4).

Figure 4: India's Renewable Power Capacity, 2014–2019 (GW)



Source: Compiled from Ministry of New and Renewable Energy data; approximate values.


India's renewable capacity more than doubled in five years. India also contributes to global health as a leading supplier of affordable generic medicines and vaccines, earning it the label “pharmacy of the world”, and to development partnerships in Africa and the Pacific through lines of credit, the India–Africa Forum Summit (2015) and capacity-building programmes such as ITEC (Ogden, 2014).

V CHALLENGES AND EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES

5.1 Geopolitical and Strategic Challenges

India's foremost strategic challenge is the rise of China, which has a far larger economy and military budget (Figure 5). The power gap allows Beijing to sustain pressure along the Himalayan frontier while expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean through ports, research vessels and naval deployments (Smith, 2014).

Figure 5: Military Expenditure of India and China, 2014–2019 (US\$ billion)



Source: Compiled from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database; approximate values (China figures are SIPRI estimates).

India's spending grew steadily, yet China still outspent it by about 3.7 to 1 in 2019. A second challenge is managing great-power rivalry: deepening ties with Washington while relying on Moscow for defence supplies requires careful balancing, especially as Russia moves closer to China (Pant & Joshi, 2016). The collusive threat of China and Pakistan along two fronts further complicates defence planning.

5.2 Economic and Trade Challenges

India's economic weight lags its geopolitical aspirations. Per-capita income remains low, manufacturing accounts for only around 15–16 per cent of GDP, and growth slowed to about 5 per cent in 2019. In November 2019, India withdrew from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations over fears of Chinese import surges. Dependence on imported energy, electronics and active pharmaceutical ingredients exposes India to supply shocks, while rising global protectionism and the US–China trade war threaten export growth (Malone, 2011). The diplomatic service is also small for a country of India's size, limiting its capacity to pursue an expansive agenda (Menon, 2016).

5.3 Regional Security Concerns

South Asia is one of the least economically integrated regions in the world, and SAARC has been largely inactive since India and others boycotted the 2016 Islamabad summit. Cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, instability in Myanmar affecting India's north-east and political volatility in Nepal and the Maldives all create risks. Tensions with Pakistan rose further after India revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 in August 2019. Maritime security challenges include piracy, illegal fishing and the growing presence of extra-regional navies (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011).

5.4 Emerging Opportunities for India

The same shifts that create risks also open opportunities (Table 5). The US-China trade war and supply-chain diversification away from China ("China plus one") began to draw investment in electronics and mobile-phone manufacturing under the "Make in India" programme. India's demographic dividend, digital public infrastructure and space programme give it distinctive assets, while its credibility with both the West and the Global South allows it to act as a bridge (Pardesi, 2015).

Table 5: Key Challenges and Corresponding Opportunities for India

Area	Challenge	Opportunity
Strategic	China's military and economic power; two-front threat	Quad, Indo-Pacific partnerships, defence indigenisation
Economic	Trade deficits, low manufacturing share	"China plus one" supply-chain shift, Make in India
Regional	Unstable neighbourhood, weak SAARC	BIMSTEC, connectivity and energy grids
Technological	Import dependence in	Digital public infrastructure,

Area	Challenge	Opportunity
	electronics and defence	space programme
Global governance	Exclusion from UNSC permanent membership	Leadership of the Global South, G4 coalition
Climate and energy	High fossil-fuel dependence	Solar leadership, International Solar Alliance

Source: Compiled by the author from Khilnani et al. (2012), Pant (2016) and Saran (2017).

5.5 Prospects of India's Global Role

In 2019 the government set a goal of a US\$5 trillion economy; sustained growth of 7–8 per cent would add considerable weight to India's diplomacy. Its prospects as a "leading power" depend on converting economic growth into military, technological and institutional capacity (Mohan, 2015). Most analysts expect India to remain a non-allied, independent pole — a partner of many but an ally of none — whose choices will be pivotal in shaping Asia's balance of power (Basrur, 2017).

VI CONCLUSION

6.1 Major Findings

The study finds, first, that India's foreign policy evolved from Nehruvian non-alignment to pragmatic multi-alignment, while the underlying goal of strategic autonomy remained constant (Basrur, 2017; Hall, 2016). Second, India maintains deep but differentiated partnerships: a broad strategic convergence with the United States and Europe, a durable defence relationship with Russia, and a guarded relationship with China marked by boundary tensions and a large trade deficit. Third, India has become an active shaper of global governance through the G20, BRICS, the SCO, the Quad and the UN, and a credible voice of the Global South (Narlikar, 2017). Fourth, its ambitions are constrained by the power gap with China, an unstable neighbourhood, economic vulnerabilities and limited diplomatic capacity.

6.2 Concluding Observations

By 2019 India stood at a historic juncture. The shift towards a multipolar world, intensifying US–China rivalry and the reordering of global supply chains made India a sought-after partner for almost every major power. Its democratic credentials, economic momentum and civilisational confidence give it the potential to be a leading power rather than merely a balancing one (Pardesi, 2015; Tharoor, 2012). However, influence abroad depends on strength at home: sustained growth, social cohesion and effective institutions are the true foundations of India's foreign policy (Malone, 2011; Menon, 2016).

6.3 Suggestions and Future Prospects

1. Strengthen economic foundations: Expand manufacturing, conclude balanced trade agreements and reduce critical import dependencies to give diplomacy a stronger economic base.
2. Prioritise the neighbourhood: Deepen connectivity, energy grids and trade through BIMSTEC and bilateral initiatives, and respond to smaller neighbours' sensitivities to counter external influence.
3. Manage China through deterrence and dialogue: Build border infrastructure and military capability while keeping diplomatic channels open to prevent escalation.
4. Expand diplomatic capacity: Enlarge the Indian Foreign Service, strengthen think tanks and integrate economic, technological and security expertise into policy-making (Khilnani et al., 2012).
5. Lead on global public goods: Use India's experience in digital public infrastructure, climate action and affordable medicines to shape global norms and champion the Global South.
6. Pursue institutional reform: Continue the campaign for UN Security Council reform and greater voice for developing countries in international financial institutions.

If these steps are taken, India is well placed to move from being a balancing power to a leading power

that helps shape a more inclusive and stable international order (Mohan, 2015; Saran, 2017).

REFERENCES

- [1] Bajpai, K., Basit, S., & Krishnappa, V. (Eds.). (2014). *India's grand strategy: History, theory, cases*. New Delhi, India: Routledge.
- [2] Basrur, R. (2017). Modi's foreign policy fundamentals: A trajectory unchanged. *International Affairs*, 93(1), 7–26.
- [3] Chacko, P. (2012). *Indian foreign policy: The politics of postcolonial identity from 1947 to 2004*. London, England: Routledge.
- [4] Ganguly, S. (Ed.). (2010). *India's foreign policy: Retrospect and prospect*. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.
- [5] Hall, I. (2016). Multialignment and Indian foreign policy under Narendra Modi. *The Round Table*, 105(3), 271–286.
- [6] Khilnani, S., Kumar, R., Mehta, P. B., Menon, P., Nilekani, N., Raghavan, S., Saran, S., & Varadarajan, S. (2012). *NonAlignment 2.0: A foreign and strategic policy for India in the twenty first century*. New Delhi, India: Centre for Policy Research.
- [7] Malone, D. M. (2011). *Does the elephant dance? Contemporary Indian foreign policy*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- [8] Malone, D. M., Mohan, C. R., & Raghavan, S. (Eds.). (2015). *The Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- [9] Menon, S. (2016). *Choices: Inside the making of India's foreign policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- [10] Mohan, C. R. (2012). *Samudra manthan: Sino-Indian rivalry in the Indo-Pacific*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- [11] Mohan, C. R. (2015). *Modi's world: Expanding India's sphere of influence*. New Delhi, India: HarperCollins.
- [12] Mukherjee, R., & Malone, D. M. (2011). *Indian foreign policy and contemporary*

- security challenges. *International Affairs*, 87(1), 87–104.
- [13] Narlikar, A. (2017). India's role in global governance: A Modi-fication? *International Affairs*, 93(1), 93–111.
- [14] Ogden, C. (2014). *Indian foreign policy: Ambition and transition*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
- [15] Pant, H. V. (2016). *Indian foreign policy: An overview*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.
- [16] Pant, H. V., & Joshi, Y. (2016). *The US pivot and Indian foreign policy: Asia's evolving balance of power*. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- [17] Pardesi, M. S. (2015). Is India a great power? Understanding great power status in contemporary international relations. *Asian Security*, 11(1), 1–30.
- [18] Saran, S. (2017). *How India sees the world: Kautilya to the 21st century*. New Delhi, India: Juggernaut Books.
- [19] Smith, J. M. (2014). *Cold peace: China–India rivalry in the twenty-first century*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- [20] Tharoor, S. (2012). *Pax Indica: India and the world of the twenty-first century*. New Delhi, India: Allen Lane.